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Few aspects of biology are linked to so many evolutionary conflicts as sperm production and fertilization. Segregation distortion
and maternal inheritance of cytoplasmic genes, causing maladapted males, are common sources of variation in the competitive
ability of sperm, leading males to vary in their intrinsic fertility. Here, I theoretically analyze the effect of such variation in
male intrinsic fertility on ejaculate investment. The model reveals that with increasing variation in male fertility, males should
overall spend less resources on their ejaculates. Furthermore, if males differing in intrinsic fertility are able to invest differently
in sperm production, there are two contrasting outcomes. Typically, less fertile males should invest more. However, if female
mating frequency is relatively low and differences between males relatively large, the most common male genotype should invest
more. These results have important consequences both for the understanding of sperm competition strategies as well as for the
evolution of female polyandry and female mating preferences.
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When females mate with more than one male and sperm com-
petition occurs (cf. Parker 1970), male reproductive success will
not only be affected by males’ access to female mating partners,
but also by the success of their sperm in the subsequent compe-
tition for fertilizations. Sperm competition is thus a strong selec-
tive force that has considerable effects on many aspects of male
reproductive biology (Parker 1970; Birkhead and Møller 1998;
Simmons 2001; Birkhead et al. 2009). One interesting aspect of
sperm competition that has received much theoretical and empiri-
cal attention regards what amount of their reproductive resources
males should allocate to sperm production and how these sperm
should be allocated to subsequent matings (Wedell et al. 2002;
Parker and Pizzari 2010).
Many theoretical analyses on sperm competition have as-
sumed that all males within a population are equivalent (Parker
and Pizzari 2010), but this is most often not the case. Males might
for instance differ in the competitive roles they occupy (Parker
1990a,b). However, males might also differ in other aspects, such
as attractiveness, condition, or sperm quality and this is likely
to have an effect on how they should invest their reproductive
resources. In fact, Tazzyman et al. (2009) showed that males
that differ in the cost of achieving matings (i.e., attractiveness)
are predicted to differ in resource allocation to sperm competi-
tion: attractive males should invest less (see also Engqvist 2011).
However, according to the study by Tazzyman et al. (2009), the
amount of reproductive resources available should not produce se-
lection for differing ejaculate investment strategies. Still, another
study (Engqvist and Reinhold 2007) showed that male variation
in sperm competitiveness (sperm reserves) has a strong effect on
optimal sperm allocation. Here, I will analyze the common situa-
tion where there are differences in male intrinsic fertility affecting
the sperm competitiveness of males.
A widespread origin of intermale variation in sperm
competition is caused by genetic conflicts (Burt and Trivers
2006). Segregation distorters are “selfish genes” that are able
to increase their transmission to future generations by killing or
incapacitating the sperm that do not carry them, resulting in
meiotic drive. Males heterozygous for segregation distorters
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consequently have reduced fertility (Burt and Trivers 2006; Price
et al. 2008a; Price and Wedell 2008). With no associated costs,
segregation distorters are expected to rapidly reach fixation
within a population. However, if there are inherent costs for
individuals carrying the segregation distorter, a polymorphism
will be expected (Pomiankowski 1999; Weissing and van Boven
2001; Burt and Trivers 2006), with variation in male fertility as a
result. Furthermore, cytoplasmic genetic elements, such as mito-
chondria, are typically exclusively maternally transmitted to the
zygote, so mitochondrial function is selected only in females and
not in males (but see Unckless and Herren 2009; Wade and Brand-
vain 2009). Nevertheless, there is ample evidence that sperm
viability and motility is affected by mitochondria (Ruiz-Pesini
et al. 2000; May-Panloup et al. 2003; Froman and Kirby 2005;
Dowling et al. 2007b; Smith et al. 2010), which should have
effects on the competition success of sperm (but see Dowling
et al. 2007a; Friberg and Dowling 2008). Thus, male fertility
might be reduced by suboptimal mitochondrial genes (Frank
and Hurst 1996; Gemmell et al. 2004; Zeh 2004; Zeh and Zeh
2005; Dowling et al. 2008). If selection in females is weak or
absent, a relatively large proportion of males are expected to
carry these suboptimal mitochondrial genes (Frank and Hurst
1996; Innocenti et al. 2011), a phenomenon that has been referred
to as mother’s curse (Gemmell et al. 2004). Optimal resource
allocation patterns might differ for such males compared to
intrinsically more fertile males. For instance, should males that
are intrinsically less fertile compensate and invest more in sperm
traits, or instead concentrate investment on traits affecting mating
success?
In this manuscript, I will analyze the effect of variation in
male fertility driven by genetic conflicts on the evolution of sperm
competition strategies. I will analyze two different scenarios. In
a first basic model, males are not able to make their allocation
strategy dependent on their “fertility genes.” Thus, males do not
“know” which genotype they belong to and will follow an un-
conditional strategy. Still, the population frequency of selfish
genes (and overall fertility) can have an effect on the evolu-
tionarily stable male ejaculate allocation. In the second model,
it is assumed that males, which differ in intrinsic fertility, have
conditional strategies. Thus, they have information about which
genotype they belong to and can allocate their resources accord-
ingly. This scenario would be particularly biologically relevant, if
one assumes that epispastic interactions have evolved (i.e., genes
coding for a resource allocation strategy are differently expressed
depending on genetic background). In relation to selfish genetic
elements, conditional strategies have been demonstrated for in-
stance in mice, where individuals carrying the t-complex in many
respects (e.g., aggression, mate choice) behave differently from
wild-type mice (Lenington 1991; Lenington et al. 1996; Carroll
et al. 2004).
Methods
BASIC MODEL STRUCTURE
In sperm competition, the best ejaculate strategy for a particular
male will depend on the strategies used by his competitors. An
evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) approach (Maynard Smith
1982) is therefore often appropriate to analyze these problems
(Parker 1998; Parker and Pizzari 2010). The focus here is on what
quantity of his resources a male should allocate to the ejaculate in
each mating. We denote an ejaculation strategy by sˆ if it used by
almost all males in the population (resident strategy). The repro-
ductive success (w) of a male will be the product of the number
of matings (n) and the expected value (fertilization success, v)
of each one. For a male with a mutant ejaculate strategy s in
a resident population, this amounts to: w(s, sˆ) = n(s, sˆ) · v(s, sˆ).
In line with many other sperm competition models (e.g., Parker
1998; Tazzyman et al. 2009), I will assume that there is a trade-
off between investment in winning fertilizations (i.e., ejaculate
investment) and obtaining matings. This trade-off is expressed as
R = n(c + Ds), where s is ejaculate size, R is the total amount of
male reproductive resources, c is the cost of each mating, and D
the cost of each ejaculate unit. If we instead measure R and c in
units of D, this simplifies to R = n(c + s). The relative number
of matings of a mutant male with ejaculate size s in a resident
population with ejaculate size sˆ will thus be equal to
n˜ (s, sˆ) = R/ (c + s)
R/ (c + sˆ) =
c + sˆ
c + s . (1)
In all models, the success in sperm competition follows the
principle of a raffle. However, it is assumed that a certain propor-
tion of all males are carrying genes that affect their fertility. Thus
although such males, here called type-2 males, invest the same
amount of energy in sperm, they will have a fertilization dis-
advantage (or advantage) relative to type-1 males. This fertility
disadvantage is represented by the parameter r (r ≥ 0). To illus-
trate this, the fertilization success of a type-1 male with ejaculate
investment s in competition with N other males, of which i are
type-2 and N − i are type-1 males, all with ejaculate investment
sˆ, will be equal to
v1 ( s, sˆ| N , i) = s
s + i · r sˆ + (N − i) sˆ . (2)
The corresponding fertilization success of a type-2 male will be
v2 ( s, sˆ| N , i) = rs
rs + i · r sˆ + (N − i) sˆ . (3)
It is indirectly assumed here that populations are large enough
in relation to female mating frequency that the probability of a
mutant male mating more than once with the same female is small.
The biological interpretation of the parameter r is the relative
number (in relation to type-1 males) of sperm that will be present
near the egg cell at the time of fertilization, hence, the relative
2686 EVOLUTION SEPTEMBER 2012
INTRINSIC FERTILITY AND SPERM INVESTMENT
number of sperm that can potentially fertilize the ova. In case of
segregation distortion, it will be a measure of how many male
sperm are killed or incapacitated and therefore will not be able to
fertilize the egg cell (i.e., the level of drive). In case of mtDNA,
it will be a measure of how strongly the motility of the sperm
is affected. Also note that a value of r < 1 corresponds to a
disadvantage (subfertility) and r > 1 an advantage (superfertility)
in relation to type-1 males. In all models it is assumed that a certain
proportion of the population (q) will be type-2 males whereas
the proportion of type-1 males will be 1 − q. It is also assumed
that this frequency is not affected by the evolutionarily stable
ejaculation strategy; hence, it is assumed as a parameter in the
models. Finally, it should be noted that a population consisting of
a fraction q of type-2 males with intrinsic fertility r compared to
type-1 males is mathematically equivalent to the situation where
there is a fraction 1 − q type-2 males with relative fertility r−1.
It will thus be sufficient to analyze and present results for the
case where type-2 males are subfertile (r < 1). Corresponding
solutions for superfertile type-2 males (r˜ = r−1 > 1) can easily be
found.
NUMERICAL SOLUTIONS AND INDIVIDUAL-BASED
SIMULATIONS
It is only possible to find analytical solutions of evolutionary equi-
libria, and thus potential ESSs, using very restrictive assumptions
on female mating frequency (see Appendices A and B). Therefore,
solutions were calculated numerically. In those situations where
female mating frequency was assumed to follow a Poisson distri-
bution, it was not possible to calculate exact numerical solutions.
There, the upper tail of the distribution had to be disregarded for
computational reasons. This refers to a very small fraction of fe-
males (cutoff at 10−9) with exceptionally high mating frequency.
Subsequently, invasion and convergence stability criteria (see Es-
hel 1983; Dieckmann and Law 1996; Geritz et al. 1998; Leimar
2009) were evaluated numerically. In all cases, it was verified that
equilibria were both evolutionarily and convergence stable.
Additionally, individual-based simulations were performed
to complement the mathematical results. The simulations relax
the assumptions used in the analytical approach, that is, that mu-
tations have small effect and only occur in resident populations
in dynamical equilibrium. Details of the simulations are given in
Appendix C.
Analyses and Results
MODEL 1: UNCONDITIONAL EJACULATE
ALLOCATION
Here it is assumed that males have no information (cf. Parker
1990a) on which fertility genes they carry. We therefore search
for a common unconditional ESS for all males given the frequency
q of type-2 males in the population. The reproductive success of
a mutant male in a resident population will be equal to
w(s, sˆ|q) = n˜(s, sˆ) ·
[ ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | q)
·((1 − q) · v1(s, sˆ|N , i) + q · v2(s, sˆ|N , i))
]
. (4)
Here, PN is the probability that a given male mating will result
in competition with the sperm from N other males (see also En-
gqvist and Reinhold 2006; Fromhage et al. 2008; Tazzyman et
al. 2009), and Bin(N ; i | q) represents the binomial probability
that a female mating with N other males will mate with exactly
i type-2 males, given the population frequency q of such males.
Note that males do not have any information on their own status
and the probability that they will be type-1 males is (1 − q), and q
is the probability that they are type-2 males. In each case the male
will have the fertilization success v1 and v2 (see eqs. 2 and 3),
respectively.
We can find the ESS (s∗) by solving ∂w(s,sˆ)
∂s
|s=sˆ=s∗ = 0. How-
ever, the solution is neither very pleasing to the eye nor very
informative (see Appendix A). Nevertheless, it can be shown
that ∂s∗
∂q |q=0 < 0 and ∂s
∗
∂q |q=1 > 0 for any level of sperm com-
petition PN . This implies that deviations from a monomorphic
population, where all males are equal, will always result in a de-
crease in ejaculate investment. Similarly, it can be shown (see
Appendix A) that ∂s∗
∂r
|r=1 = 0 and ∂2s∗∂r2 |r=1 < 0. Thus, deviations
in r away from r = 1 will result in a decrease in the ESS ejac-
ulate investment. Importantly, the fact that there is a decrease is
independent of whether variation is caused by sub- or superfer-
tile type-2 males (i.e., whether r < 1 or r > 1). Furthermore, the
deviation will increase with increasing variation in male intrinsic
fertility (σ2 = q(1 − q)), and increasing differences in fertility
between males (increasing deviations from r = 1) (see Fig. 1 and
Appendix A). Quantitative numerical solutions and individual-
based simulations confirm these analytical conclusions (see
Fig. 1). Using individual-based simulations, the conclusion that
increased variation in intrinsic male fertility will lead to a de-
crease in ejaculate investment can also be made for the more
general case, where there is a continuous fertility variation (see
Fig. 2). This is a more realistic scenario in the case where fertility
variation is caused by variation in mitochondrial function.
MODEL 2: CONDITIONAL EJACULATE ALLOCATION
Here it is assumed that the ejaculate strategy of type-1 males
can be different from the ejaculate strategy of type-2 males. We
are searching for an evolutionary equilibrium describing the joint
ESSs for both types of males—s∗1 for type-1 males and s∗2 for
type-2 males. The derivation of the fitness equations is quite
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Figure 1. ESS ejaculate investment for the unconditional model.
The level of sperm competition is modeled using a full-range ap-
proach, where it is assumed that females mate at least once and
the number of female additional matings follows a Poisson dis-
tribution with an expected number of μ additional mates. Lines
depict analytical solutions and points and error bars show the
mean ± SD outcome of the individual-based simulations (n = 10).
Ejaculate expenditure is expressed relative to the total expendi-
ture on a given mating (s∗/c+ s∗). The upper set of lines show the
result for μ = 1.0 and the lower for μ = 0.5. All results are calcu-
lated assuming c = 1. Qualitatively similar results can be obtained
for other female mating frequency distributions. Here only results
for subfertile (r < 1) type-2 males are shown. Corresponding re-
sults for superfertile (r > 1) type-2 males can be found by setting
r˜ = r−1 and q˜ = 1 − q.
straightforward. First we assume that most type-1 males in the
population follow the strategy sˆ1, and most type-2 males the strat-
egy sˆ2. The fitness of a type-1 male following a mutant strategy
s1 in this population is given by
w1(s1, sˆ1 | sˆ2, q) = n1(s1, sˆ1 | sˆ2)
·
( ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | qˆ′) · s1
s1 + i · rsˆ2 + (N − i) · sˆ1
)
.
(5)
Correspondingly, the fitness of a type-2 male following a mutant
strategy s2 will be
w2(s2, sˆ2 | sˆ1, q) = n2(s2, sˆ2 | sˆ1)
·
( ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | qˆ′) · rs2
rs2 + i · rsˆ2 + (N − i) · sˆ1
)
.
(6)
Here Bin(N ; i | q ′) represents the probability that a female mat-
ing with N other males will mate with exactly i type-2 males,
given the probability qˆ ′ that females will mate with such males.
However, unless sˆ1 = sˆ2, qˆ ′ will not equal q , the population fre-
quency of type-2 males, because if different types of males in-
vest differently in matings, their mating success will differ and
the probability to compete against different types of males will
change. We can represent the mating success of type-1 males by
nˆ1 = R/(c + sˆ1), and that of type-2 males by nˆ2 = R/(c + sˆ2).
Assuming that males with mutant ejaculate strategies are rare, the
proportion of female matings that involve type-2 males will be
given by qˆ ′ = qnˆ2qnˆ2+(1−q)nˆ1 .
We can find the ESSs by solving the following equation
system ⎧⎪⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎪⎩
∂
∂s1
w1(s1, sˆ1 | sˆ2, q)
∣∣∣∣
s1=sˆ1=s∗1
= 0
∂
∂s2
w2(s2, sˆ2 | sˆ1, q)
∣∣∣∣
s2=sˆ2=s∗2
= 0
.
(7)
It is not possible to find analytical solutions to this. Still, it is
straightforward to find numerical solutions for given values of r
and q. It is also possible to gain some more general insight (see
Appendix B), using perturbation analysis (Hinsch 1991). It can be
shown that the outcome depends crucially on the level of sperm
competition and the magnitude of the fertility difference between
males. For small values of expected female mating frequencies
(Figs. 3A–C, 4), males belonging to the less fertile genotype are
expected to invest more in sperm except for relatively large devia-
tions from r = 1. Then the most common genotype should invest
more. For larger values of expected female mating frequency the
resulting pattern changes (Figs. 3D–F, 4). Independent of their fre-
quency, less fertile males are always predicted to produce larger
ejaculates (Figs. 3D–F, 4).
Discussion
It was shown here that intrinsic differences in male fertility will
affect overall male sperm investment. Variation in male fertility
caused by for instance mtDNA mutations or selfish segregation
distorters will have as an effect that males should overall spend
less resources on ejaculate investment (Figs. 1, 2). The reason for
this is that as intermale fertility differences become larger, fertil-
ization success will be less influenced by ejaculate investment;
instead intrinsic male fertility will dictate sperm competition suc-
cess. In contrast, when all males are equal, ejaculate investment is
the only influencing factor, and males are expected to invest more.
If males can allocate resources to sperm investment dependent on
their own fertility, it was predicted that less fertile males should
partly compensate their disadvantage by investing more in sperm
competition, unless differences between males are very large.
Then the most common genotype should invest more. This can
be related to a study by Engqvist and Reinhold (2007), where it
was found that males should maximize investment against similar
competitors. The reason for this result is that against identically
strong competitors, the outcome of sperm competition will be
2688 EVOLUTION SEPTEMBER 2012
INTRINSIC FERTILITY AND SPERM INVESTMENT
Figure 2. ESS ejaculate investment for the unconditional model when intrinsic male fertility is continuously distributed around a mean
of r = 1. The value σ gives the standard deviation of the truncated Gaussian distribution (only positive values of r are possible). The value
μ corresponds to the expected number of female additional mates (Poisson distributed). Results are given as the mean ± SE ejaculate
strategy from individual-based simulations (n = 20 for each parameter combination). Values are given in relation to expected values
given no variation in fertility (dotted line). The decrease in ejaculate expenditure with increasing variation in fertility was statistically
highly significant for all values of μ (all F1,98 > 19.5, all P < 0.0001). The magnitude of this effect was stronger at higher levels of sperm
competition (variation × female mating frequency: F1,496 = 12.8, P < 0.001).
determined by sperm investment only. In contrast, the outcome of
a raffle between very dissimilar competitors will to a large extent
be affected by the difference in intrinsic sperm competitiveness,
and not so much by the actual investment in that particular mating
(Engqvist and Reinhold 2007). If a male belongs to a common
genotype, he will often face competition against similar com-
petitors. Consequently, such males should invest more than rare
genotypes in sperm competition. For rare males, which face sperm
competition against dissimilar competitors, ejaculate investment
will only weakly influence the outcome of sperm competition.
Because they are rare, subfertile males will lose and superfertile
males will win irrespective of their investment. As rare subfertile
males will have such a low gain from their investment, they should
instead strive to gain more matings and so increase their chances
of fertilization from those matings not involving sperm compe-
tition. However, for inferior competitors the chance of gaining
paternity without competition will become negligible as the de-
gree of sperm competition increases. This is the reason why the
pattern that the most common type should invest the most van-
ishes with increasing female mating frequency (see Figs. 3, 4).
Rare subfertile males will then benefit by investing more in ejac-
ulates, as this is the only way to gain any paternity at all. Superior
competitors, however, will have a lower return from sperm invest-
ment as they will gain a large share of paternity nonetheless, and
increasing investment will only weakly affect fertilization suc-
cess. Thus, when sperm competition is common, subfertile males
will always benefit more from sperm investment than superfertile
males.
The situation analyzed here bears resemblance, both with re-
spect to the competition structure and results, to the nonrandom
loaded raffle with favored and disfavored roles (Parker 1990a).
The rationale for that model was to analyze situations in which
the first or the second male to mate may be favored. In the present
analyses this would correspond to whether males are favored in
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Figure 3. ESS ejaculate investment for type-1 males (gray) and type-2 (subfertile) males (black) in the conditional model. The level of
sperm competition is modeled using a full-range approach, where it is assumed that females mate at least once and the number of female
additional matings follows a Poisson distribution with an expected number of μ additional mates. Lines depict analytical solutions and
points and error bars show the mean ± SD outcome of the individual-based simulations (n = 10). Ejaculate expenditure is expressed
relative to the total expenditure on a given mating (s∗/c+ s∗). Type-2 strategies at q = 0 and type-1 strategies for q = 1 are not shown,
as they are not expressed in any individual, and hence there is no selection on these values. All results are calculated assuming c = 1.
sperm competition because of superior intrinsic fertility. However,
this model cannot be directly applied to the present situation, as
in a loaded raffle there is always competition between exactly one
disfavored and one favored male. This is fundamentally differ-
ent from the present situation where we have variation in male
fertility. Here sperm competition can occur between any number
of fertile and subfertile males, and even continuous variation in
intrinsic fertility is possible. Nevertheless, two important predic-
tions that are related to the present analyses can be inferred from
the loaded raffle model (Parker 1990a, 1998; Parker and Pizzari
2010): (1) overall ejaculate investment should decrease with in-
creasing “unfairness” of the game (see also Williams et al. 2005;
Engqvist and Reinhold 2006; Fromhage et al. 2008), and (2) if
males have information about their role, males in the disfavored
role should invest more. It is interesting that in the different sce-
nario analyzed here, both these predictions are reinforced, but
with both extensions and modifications. Here it is shown that
ejaculate investment should decrease with increasing differences
(r) between male competitiveness (corresponding to unfairness).
However, the effect of fertility variation, one of the central is-
sues here, cannot be resolved from the loaded raffle model. The
results presented here demonstrate that ejaculate investment is
predicted to be lowest at intermediate frequencies of subfertile
males (see Fig. 1) corresponding to the largest variation in male
sperm competitiveness. In addition, this prediction could also be
extended to the much more general case where there are not only
two male types, but continuous variation in intrinsic male fertility
(Fig. 2). The second prediction from the loaded raffle model that
males in the disfavored role should invest more (Parker 1990a)
was reflected in the present study with the prediction that, typ-
ically, less fertile males should invest more. Nevertheless, it is
also shown here that this prediction is not general. When dif-
ferences between males are large and sperm competition risk is
low, the common male type should invest more irrespective of its
disadvantage/advantage. The main reason behind the prediction
that common males should invest more is that common males
will more often compete against a competitor of similar strength.
However, loaded raffles are always staged between a favored and
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Figure 4. Lines showing, for any value of subfertility disadvan-
tage, the frequency at which subfertile type-2 and type-1 males
are expected to invest equally in ejaculates. The different lines
indicate different levels of sperm competition. The value μ corre-
sponds to the expected number of female additional mates (Pois-
son distributed). Above the lines subfertile type-2 males are ex-
pected to invest more, whereas below the lines superfertile type-1
males are expected to invest more. For q-values larger than 0.5,
subfertile type-2 males are under all circumstances expected to
invest more—they will both be less fertile and belong to the most
common genotype.
disfavored male. Thus, competition between similar males never
occurs and this provides a likely explanation for the differences
in predictions.
In all analyses presented here, the population frequency of
different genotypes was assumed to be fixed. Thus, changes in
male sperm allocation strategies did not change this frequency.
This situation most closely resembles the mother’s curse situation
with suboptimal mtDNA genotypes. In this situation intrinsic fer-
tility will not be heritable, and thus not subject to evolutionary
change due to selection (Frank and Hurst 1996; Gemmell et al.
2004; Zeh and Zeh 2005; Innocenti et al. 2011). However, the
assumption that male sperm allocation strategies do not change
the frequency of male fertility genotypes will be violated in the
segregation distortion scenario. Here, the frequency of drive will
be influenced by the ejaculate investment of different genotypes.
Therefore, to completely understand the association between the
occurrence of meiotic drive and male ejaculate investment, we
need to develop more dynamic models, taking changes in the fre-
quency of segregation distortion into account. Nevertheless, the
present analyses do already give some insights and predictions for
the relationship between meiotic drive and male ejaculate alloca-
tion. One would, for instance, expect that populations with high
incidence of meiotic drive should invest less in sperm competi-
tion traits, and this effect should be more pronounced in systems
with stronger drive. Furthermore, if males can allocate resources
dependent on their own status, there are two contrasting scenar-
ios. If females mate with many males and segregation distortion
is relatively common in the population, we would expect less
fertile males to invest more. However, with low risk of sperm
competition and low frequency of segregation distortion, the op-
posite pattern is expected. There is to my knowledge no study
explicitly demonstrating effects on sperm production and ejacu-
late investment in relation to segregation distortion (see review by
Price and Wedell 2008). However, there are some indications that
segregation distortion does indeed affect male reproductive invest-
ment. In mice, the t-complex is a segregation distorter that causes
reduction in male fertility (Lyon 1987). Yet, male t-genotypes
are more dominant resulting in better survival and mating suc-
cess than wild-type males (Lenington et al. 1996; but see Carroll
et al. 2004). Possibly, this is because these genotypes invest less in
sperm competition traits and therefore have more resources avail-
able to secure matings. This would fit well with the predictions
presented here, as the t-haplotype usually occurs at relatively low
frequencies (Ardlie and Silver 1998) in a species with relatively
low levels of sperm competition (Ardlie and Silver 1998; Dean
et al. 2006). Furthermore, in Drosophila there is evidence that
the fertility disadvantage of males carrying segregation distorters
is more pronounced in multiple mating situations than for vir-
gin males (Jaenike 1996; Atlan et al. 2004), indicating effects on
sperm production.
The expectations for the situations when male fertility differ-
ences are caused by suboptimal mtDNA (i.e., mother’s curse) are
similar to the ones described for segregation distortion. However,
in contrast to segregation distortion, polymorphism of mitochon-
drial genes affecting male fertility will be facilitated by random
genetic drift processes. Fixation of neutral or near neutral alleles
due to genetic drift will be less pronounced in large populations
(Crow and Kimura 1970), and allelic variation is therefore ex-
pected to be larger in those populations. An interesting and novel
prediction that can easily be tested would therefore be that males
in larger populations invest less in sperm competition. However,
size differences of populations must have a relatively long history,
as fertility variation and accompanying ejaculation strategies must
have time to evolve.
As in many sperm competition models (but see Williams
et al. 2005; Fromhage et al. 2008), the effects of strategic al-
location on female mating frequency are largely ignored in the
present study. However, many of the processes analyzed here will
certainly affect female mating behavior. Female polyandry might
be expected to evolve as a response to decreased fertility caused
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by for instance segregation distortion (Haig and Bergstrom 1995;
Price et al. 2008b; Manser et al. 2011). If male fertility variation is
associated with a reduction in male ejaculate investment, this ef-
fect will be amplified and females would benefit even more from
multiple mating and an increased female mating rate is expected
as a response to male strategic ejaculation. However, male strate-
gic allocation might not only affect female mating rate but also
preferences. In some situations, especially when female mating
rate is low, we expect less fertile males to reduce investment in
sperm competition and instead concentrate investment on traits
affecting mating success, such as attractive ornaments. On the
other hand females are expected to prefer fertile males (Keller
and Reeve 1995; Arnqvist and Nilsson 2000; Jennions and Petrie
2000) and males lacking segregation distorters (Reinhold et al.
1999). Thus, male compensatory investment will be in conflict
with the evolutionary interests of females, with interesting im-
plications for the coevolutionary dynamics between male repro-
ductive resource allocation patterns and female mate preferences.
Possibly genetic conflicts might trigger the fast evolution of new
female mating preferences (see also Wiens 2001; van Doorn and
Weissing 2006), and such evolving preferences are likely to affect
male sperm strategies (Tazzyman et al. 2012). Nevertheless, the
present study was a first effort to investigate male ejaculate allo-
cation in relation to genetic conflicts causing a reduction in male
fertility. To deepen our understanding of the evolutionary causes
and consequences of sperm competition, future studies should
also aim to take the coevolutionary dynamics affecting male and
female reproductive behavior into account.
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Appendix A
For the unconditional model, the fitness function is given by
w(s, sˆ|q) = n˜(s, sˆ) ·
[ ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | q)
·
(
(1−q) s
s + ir sˆ + (N − i)sˆ +q
rs
rs + ir sˆ + (N − i)sˆ
)]
.
We can find the ESS (s∗) by setting ∂w(s,sˆ)
∂s
|s=sˆ=s∗ = 0, which gives
∂
n˜(s, sˆ)
∂s
∣∣∣∣∣
s=sˆ=s∗
·
[ ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | q)
·
(
(1 − q) s
s + ir sˆ + (N − i)sˆ + q
rs
rs + ir sˆ + (N − i)sˆ
)]
s=sˆ=s∗
+ n˜(s, sˆ)|s=sˆ=s∗ ·
[ ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | q)
·
(
(1 − q) ∂
∂s
(
s
s + ir sˆ + (N − i)sˆ
)
+ q ∂
∂s
(
rs
rs + ir sˆ + (N − i)sˆ
))]
s=sˆ=s∗
= 0.
The first set of summations (without differentials) can be
simplified to
∑∞
N=0 PN (N + 1)−1. After inserting n˜(s, sˆ) =
(c + sˆ)/(c + s) (see eq. 1), ∂ n˜/∂s = −(c + sˆ)/(c + s)2, and dif-
ferentiating and evaluating the remainder of the expression, we
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can solve for s∗, which gives
s∗ = c
∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | q)
⎛
⎝ (1 − q) (ir + N − i)
(1 + ir + (N − i))2 +
qr (ir + N − i)
(r + ir + (N − i))2
⎞
⎠
∞∑
N=0
PN
1
N + 1 −
∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | q)
⎛
⎝ (1 − q) (ir + N − i)
(1 + ir + (N − i))2 +
qr (ir + N − i)
(r + ir + (N − i))2
⎞
⎠
. (A.1)
Without specific knowledge of PN , which characterizes the
level of sperm competition and is affected by female mating fre-
quency, it is obviously not possible to make any quantitative pre-
dictions. However, we can still gain some general qualitative in-
sight into the ESS described in equation (A.1). If we define
f (q, r | N ) =
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i | q)
( (1 − q)(ir + N − i)
(1 + ir + (N − i))2
+ qr (ir + N − i)(r + ir + (N − i))2
)
,
the ESS can be written as
s∗ = c
∞∑
N=0
PN · f (q, r | N )
a −
∞∑
N=0
PN · f (q, r | N )
where a =
∞∑
N=0
PN
1
N + 1 > 0.
The main interest here is on the effect of male fertility dif-
ferences, hence, on the effect of the parameters r and q. We can
therefore next analyze how the ESS will change with the frequency
type-2 males, by taking the partial differential with respect to q:
∂s∗
∂q
= c
a
∞∑
N=0
PN · ∂
∂q
( f (q, r | N ))
[
a −
∞∑
N=0
PN · f (q, r | N )
]2 .
It is obvious that the denominator will always be positive, thus the
qualitative behavior will be determined by the numerator alone.
It can be shown that
∂
∂q
( f (q, r | N ))
∣∣∣∣
q=0
= − N
N + 1 ·
(
r − 1
r + N
)2
,
which is negative irrespective of r and N (N > 0) , hence ∂s∗
∂q |q=0 <
0. Similarly, it can be shown that
∂
∂q
( f (q, r | N ))
∣∣∣∣
q=1
= N
N + 1 ·
(
r − 1
Nr + 1
)2
,
which is positive irrespective of r, from which follows that
∂s∗
∂q |q=1 > 0. The implication of this is that deviations from a
monomorphic homogenous population, where all males are equal,
will always result in a decrease in ejaculate investment. This
decrease is independent from whether variation is caused by sub-
or superfertile type-2 males.
An alternative way to reach similar, yet even more far-
reaching, conclusions is to take the partial derivatives of the ESS
s∗ with respect to r around r = 1:
∂s∗
∂r
∣∣∣∣
r=1
= c
a
∞∑
N=0
PN · ∂
∂r
( f (q, r | N ))
∣∣∣∣
r=1[
a −
∞∑
N=0
PN · f (q, r | N )
∣∣∣∣
r=1
]2 .
It can be shown that ∂
∂r
( f (q, r | N ))|r=1 = 0, and hence
∂s∗
∂r
|r=1 = 0. Thus very small differences in fertility between males
will have a very small effect on the ESS. The second derivative
can be simplified to
∂2s∗
∂r2
∣∣∣∣
r=1
= c
a
∞∑
N=0
PN · ∂
2
∂r2
( f (q, r | N ))
∣∣∣∣
r=1[
a −
∞∑
N=0
PN · f (q, r | N )
∣∣∣∣
r=1
]2
(where the simplification is facilitated due to the fact that
∂
∂r
( f (q, r | N ))|r=1 = 0). Again it thus suffices to consider the nu-
merator. It is straightforward to show that ∂2
∂r2
( f (q, r | N ))|r=1 =
− 2Nq(1−q)(1+N )3 , which is always negative, and hence ∂
2s∗
∂r2
|r=1 < 0.
Appendix B
For the conditional model, the fitness functions for type-1 and
type-2 males are given by
w1 (s1, sˆ1|sˆ2, q) = n1 (s1, sˆ1|sˆ2)
·
( ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i|qˆ′) · s1
s1 + ir sˆ2 + (N − i)sˆ1
)
(B.1)
and
w2(s2, sˆ2|sˆ1, q) = n2(s2, sˆ2|sˆ1)
·
( ∞∑
N=0
PN
N∑
i=0
Bin(N; i|qˆ′) · rs2
rs2 + ir sˆ2 + (N − i)sˆ1
)
.
(B.2)
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An evolutionary equilibrium corresponding to a potential
ESS must satisfy
∂wi
∂si
∣∣∣∣
si =sˆi =s∗i
= 0 for i = {1, 2} . (B.3)
The solution to this equation is more straightforward to interpret
and also easier to obtain if we assume that there is a value m with
the following property m = s∗2
s∗1
, where m ≥ 0. This value thus
gives the relative sperm investment of type-2 males compared to
type-1 males.
However, to proceed in this model we must start by defining
PN , which describes the level of sperm competition in equations
(B.1) and (B.2). Dependent on mathematical tractability, this has
been represented by risk models, where females mate once or
twice, by intensity models where all females mate N times, and by
so-called full-range models, where female mating frequency can
effectively follow any distribution (Parker and Pizzari 2010). The
qualitative outcome here depends on PN , and I will therefore show
analyses of all these scenarios and start with sperm competition
risk.
In the sperm competition risk scenario, there is a probabil-
ity (risk) p that a female will mate or has mated with another
male. On average, females will thus mate 1 + p times. From
a male perspective, a fraction 2p of these will result in com-
petition with the sperm from one other male, whereas the rest
(1 − p) will not result in any sperm competition. Thus, in this
case P0 = (1 − p)/(1 + p) and P1 = 2p/(1 + p) (see also Parker
et al. 1997). If we insert this into equations (B.1) and (B.2), we can
obtain a closed-form expression of equation (B.3), but this is un-
wieldy. Furthermore, closed-form solutions could not be obtained.
Nevertheless, we can find an exact solution for the special case
where r = 1. Thus, to attain some more general insight, we can
find approximate solutions around this value by means of pertur-
bation analysis (Hinsch 1991). For r = 1, all males are equal and
the model is equivalent with a fair raffle model (Parker 1990a),
and gives the solutions m = 1 and s∗1 = cp/(2 − p). The latter is
equivalent with the solution given by Parker et al. (1997), but there
expressed in a different unit. The first two terms in the approxima-
tion will be s∗1 ≈ c p2−p − (1 − r )c p
2q
(2−p) and m ≈ 1 + (1 − r )p/2.
The last expression gives the relative sperm investment. Thus, we
can conclude that subfertile type-2 males with an r < 1 should
invest more than type-1 males in sperm production and super-
fertile type-2 males with an r > 1 should invest less, at least
as long as the difference in fertility is small. Hence, less fer-
tile males are predicted to partly compensate their disadvan-
tage by producing larger ejaculates. However, with increasing
deviations from r = 1, we may need to take further terms of
the approximation into account. The second order of m can be
calculated as
m2 = 116 (p + 2) · (2p
2q − p2 − 6pq + 5p + 4q − 2).
This term can indeed be both positive and negative and larger in
magnitude than the first-order term. Thus, it is possible that m < 1
although r < 1 (and m > 1 although r > 1). One can show that
for 0 ≤ p ≤ 1 and 0 ≤ q ≤ 1, ∂m2
∂q > 0 and
∂m2
∂p > 0. Thus, m, the
relative investment of type-2 males will be lowest (and possibly
<1) for small values of p and q (i.e., when they are rare). In words
this means that when sperm competition risk is low enough and
differences in fertility is sufficiently high, males belonging to the
most common genotype should invest more.
If females typically mate with more than one male, the
risk model will only poorly describe sperm competition. In
the intensity model, the assumption is made that females mate
with exactly ˜N other males. In that case the term PN will be
PN =
{
1 for N = ˜N
0 for N 	= ˜N For this model, it is also possible to find
approximate analytical solutions by perturbation analysis. For
r = 1 the model corresponds to the conventional intensity model
(Parker et al. 1996), and the solution with these values, s∗1 = ˜Nc
(and m = 1), is equivalent with the solution given there. The first-
order approximations are given by s∗1 ≈ ˜Nc −
˜Nqc
2 (1 − r ) and
m ≈ 1 + 12 (1 − r ). Thus, m will be relatively independent of the
frequency q . In fact, q appears for the first time in the third-order
term. Thus, in contrast to the results from the risk model, m > 1
for r < 1, and m < 1 for r > 1, even for large deviations from
r = 1. Hence, independent of their frequency, less fertile males
are predicted to compensate their disadvantage by producing more
sperm.
For the full-range approach, one can assume that females
mate at least once and the number of female additional mat-
ings follows a Poisson distribution with an expected number
of μ. Thus on average females will perform 1 + μ matings.
From a male perspective, a fraction (1 + N ) · Pois(N ; μ) of those
will result in sperm competition with exactly N other males
(N = {0, 1, 2, . . .}), where Pois(N ; μ) = e−μ·μNN ! is the probability
that females will mate with 1 + N males. In that case the term
PN will be described by PN = (N+1)·Pois(N ;μ)μ+1 . Here it is not pos-
sible to find an analytical solution even when r = 1. Therefore,
we cannot perturb the solution. Nevertheless, we can examine the
numerical solutions for different parameters. These analyses con-
firm the previous analytical results, but reveal no further major
insights. For small values of expected female mating frequencies,
the system behaves like a risk model. Males belonging to the less
fertile genotype are expected to invest more in sperm except for
relatively large deviations from r = 1. Then the most common
genotype should invest more. For larger values of expected fe-
male mating frequency μ, the solutions become more and more
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similar to the intensity solution. Independent of their frequency,
less fertile males are predicted to produce larger ejaculates.
Appendix C
All simulations were made in discrete nonoverlapping genera-
tions. Populations had an equal sex ratio consisting of 10,000
individuals. At the beginning of each generation a fraction 1 − q
of all individuals were assigned to be type-1 and the rest type-2.
This was done to avoid random genetic drift during the simu-
lations. The genes for sperm investment were coded as numbers
representing the amount of reproductive resources spent on sperm.
Mutation rate was set to 0.001 per gene locus and generation, and
the standard deviation of the normally distributed mutation step
was set to 0.01. If mutations rendered negative values, these were
altered to zero.
Each generation consisted of a single reproductive bout. To
begin with, the precise identities of all male mating partners were
generated for all females. First, the actual number of male mat-
ing partners was determined as a random integer drawn from the
probability function describing female mating frequency. Subse-
quently, the identity of each male was assigned by sampling from
the available males. The probability that a given male was selected
as a mating partner was proportional to the male’s expected mat-
ing success (determined by his sperm allocation strategy—see
eq. 1) in relation to the expected mating success of all males.
(Thus, it can happen that males mate twice with the same female.)
Each female produced exactly two offspring (to keep population
size constant) and the probability that an offspring was sired by
each specific male was determined as described in equations 2
and 3.
In the conditional model, males carried the genes for both
strategies. However, only one was expressed depending on which
fertility-type males belonged to. The recombination rate was set
to 0.5. In the first generation of each simulation, the males were
assigned a random allele. In the unconditional model, simulations
ran for 1000 generations, after which the strategy values were
evaluated. The models with two conditional strategies took some-
what longer to reach equilibria and simulations therefore ran for
5000 generations.
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